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Abstract
This paper presents a simple model of subsidies with export share requirements
(ESR) in a heterogeneous firm environment. A two-country general equilibrium version
of the model with a single 100% ESR is calibrated using firm-level data from the 2002
wave of the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey collected by the
World Bank for China. The calibrated model is used to gauge the change in subsidies
with ESR that is consistent with the fall in the share of pure exporters, firms exporting
all their output, observed in China, from 25.7% in 2002 to 11.1% in 2013. Our results
indicate that a 6.9% reduction in the ad-valorem subsidy rate available to firms that
export all their output is consistent with the observed fall in their share of exporting
firms. Expenditure in subsidies (as a share of value-added) falls by 66% and welfare in
China increases by 1.76% while real income in the rest of the world falls by 0.59%.
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1 Introduction
China’s integration into the world economy has been marked by vigorous export promotion
combined with a steadfast commitment to protecting its domestic market. The dual nature of
China’s trade policy regime in which export-oriented firms coexist alongside highly protected
state-owned enterprises, has been aptly described by Feenstra (1998) as “one country, two
systems.” A crucial element of China’s export promotion strategy has been the use of
subsidies with export share requirements (ESR). These encompass a wide range of fiscal
advantages such as tax deductions, access to soft loans, duty-free imports of intermediate
and capital goods and priority access to infrastructure and land, accruing to firms conditional
on their export intensity (i.e. the share of total sales accounted for by exports) exceeding a
given threshold.1 Quite often firms are required to export all their output to benefit from
the subsidies.
Although it is not possible to directly observe if a firm receives subsidies with ESR, it is
possible to identify firms that are likely to benefit from these subsidies based on their observed
export intensity. Thus, Defever and Rian˜o (2014) back out the unobserved subsidies following
a calibration strategy which utilizes data on the overall export intensity distribution of a
country and the productivity premia estimated for exporters identified as enjoying subsidies
with ESR relative to exporters that do not benefit from this policy and domestic firms.2
The World Bank’s Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS)
reveals that the share of exporters selling all their output abroad, which we denote ‘pure
exporters’, experienced a dramatic fall from 25.7% to 11.1% of exporting firms between 2002
and 2013 (see Figure 1). This pattern is consistent with a reduction in subsidies with ESR
by the Chinese government in response to greater international scrutiny of its trade policies.
1Defever and Rian˜o (2014) provide a detailed description of subsidies featuring export share requirements
available in China between 2000 and 2006.
2The main identifying assumption is that high export intensity exporters arise because of the use of
subsidies with ESR by the Chinese Government. Defever and Rian˜o (2014) show that these subsidies target
primarily three types of firms, foreign-invested enterprises, export processing establishments and firms located
in Free Trade Zones, and that the vast majority of high-intensity exporters belong to one of these groups.
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Figure 1: Export Intensity Distribution of Exporters in China
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Source: World Bank BEEPS, 2002-03 and 2012-13 waves.
In this paper, we gauge the change in subsidies with ESR which is consistent with the
decline in the share of pure exporters observed in China over the last decade. To do so, we
consider a simplified version of the model proposed by Defever and Rian˜o (2014), featuring
a single ad-valorem sales subsidy associated with a 100% export share requirement. The
parameters of the general equilibrium model are calibrated using Chinese firm-level data
from the 2002 wave of BEEPS. We use the model to quantify the effect of a reduction in
subsidies with ESR on the total expenditure on subsidies, aggregate exports and welfare for
China and the rest of the world. Our results provide a first assessment of the extent to which
China has reformed its dual export system over the last decade.
Despite undertaking wide-reaching trade liberalization reforms such as expanding trading
rights, lowering import tariffs and eliminating non-tariff barriers in anticipation to joining the
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, the use of export subsidies in China, and those
featuring export requirements in particular, was hardly curbed during this wave of reforms.
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This course of action has proven to be highly controversial. Under the terms of its accession
protocol, China was required to notify the WTO of any export subsidies in place ahead of
the annual Transitional Review Mechanism, the procedure monitoring China’s compliance
with its WTO commitments. However, despite its commitment, China only submitted two
subsidy notifications in 2006 and 2011. Both of these were deemed to be highly incomplete
because they did not disclose the level of expenditure of a large number of subsidy programs
listed in each notification. Additionally, subsidies granted at the sub-national, provincial and
local level, which are widely considered to be important instruments of export promotion,
were excluded from both notifications.3
After 2006, the US, EU and other WTO member countries have actively challenged Chi-
nese subsidies with ESR. This pressure in turn has led to the gradual dismantlement of
several subsidy programmes. For instance, the corporate income tax deduction available to
export-oriented foreign-invested enterprises was terminated in 2008. Similarly, the preferen-
tial treatment for domestically-owned firms located in Special Economic Zones and exporting
more than 70% of their output was also terminated in 2008. In both cases, a five-year tran-
sition period was established so that the new tax legislation became operational in 2012.
At the same time, several financial incentives conditional on a firm’s export intensity still
remain in place, and even new ones have been introduced over the last decade. For instance,
the first pilot “Export Processing Zones” which were established in 2000 and feature strict
limitations on firms’ domestic sales, have tripled in number by 2010. Similarly, the “Famous
Brands” initiative, a large umbrella of export support programs which included subsidies
contingent on export performance, was introduced in 2005 and was only abandoned in 2009
after being challenged by the US and the EU at the WTO the year before. The “Auto
Export Base” program introduced in 2009, was also challenged in 2012 by the Obama Ad-
ministration during the 2012 presidential election. These examples illustrate how difficult it
is to evaluate the extent to which the dual trade policy regime in China has been reformed.
3See “Request from the United States to China,” October 11, 2011, reference G/SCM/Q2/CHN/42.
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Our results show that a reduction of 6.9% in the ad-valorem sales subsidy rate offered to
pure exporters (from 30 to 27.53%) suffices to replicate the observed decline in their share
among exporting firms. This small reduction, however, produces a significant fall in the total
expenditure in export subsidies over GDP from 1.23% in 2002 to 0.42% in 2013, a reduction
of 66%. As the distortions generated by the subsidy are lessened, China’s terms-of-trade
improve and the average productivity of Chinese firms increases as well due to stronger
import competition. Both effects increase welfare (measured as real income) in China by
1.76%. Conversely, the rest of the world experiences a welfare loss of 0.59% due to the higher
price of Chinese imports.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces a 100%-ESR subsidy in a simple
partial equilibrium model of trade with heterogeneous firms. We characterize the conditions
under which pure exporters arise and coexist in equilibrium with domestic firms and firms
serving both domestic and foreign markets, which we denote ‘regular exporters’. Section 3
briefly describes how a general equilibrium version of the model in Section 2 is calibrated,
matching moments calculated using firm-level data from the 2002-2003 wave of BEEPS.
Finally, Section 4 analyzes how a fall in subsidies consistent with the reduction in the share
of pure exporters observed between 2002 and 2013 affects total expenditure in subsidies,
aggregate exports and welfare in China and the rest of the world.
2 Model
Assume that Chinese firms can sell their output in China (c) and the rest of the World (f).
The demand function faced by a firm producing variety ϕ selling in market i is:
qipϕq “ Aipipϕq´σ, i P tc, fu, (1)
where pipϕq is the price of good ϕ charged in market i, Ai is a country-specific demand
shifter and σ is the elasticity of demand. Each variety is produced by a monopolistically-
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competitive firm with technology q “ ϕl, where l denotes labor input and ϕ is a firm-specific
productivity index.
A Chinese firm can choose between three potential modes of operation: (i) produce for the
domestic market alone, which entails paying a fixed cost fd, (ii) become a regular exporter
selling both domestically and abroad, by paying a fixed cost of exporting fx in addition to
the fixed cost of operating in the domestic market or (iii) become a pure exporter, i.e. a firm
that exports all its output because it faces a 100% export share requirement.4 The latter
option requires the firm to pay a fixed cost fx and enables it to receive an ad-valorem subsidy
s on its sales.
Let k P td, x, pu index the three possible modes of production: domestic, regular and pure
exporter respectively. The profit that a firm of productivity ϕ attains in operation mode k
is:
pikpϕ, sq “
$’’’’’’&’’’’’’%
κAcpϕqσ´1 ´ fd, if k “ d,
κrAc ` τ 1´σAf spϕqσ´1 ´ pfd ` fxq, if k “ x,
κp1` sqστ 1´σAf pϕqσ´1 ´ fx, if k “ p,
(2)
where κ ” pσ ´ 1qσ´1σ´σ and the wage in China has been normalized to 1. Both regular
and pure exporters face an iceberg transport cost τ ě 1 when selling their output abroad.
A Chinese firm with productivity ϕ chooses to operate under the pure exporter mode
k “ p if pippϕ, sq ě maxtpidpϕq, pixpϕq, 0u, or equivalently if pippϕ, sq ě pidpϕq, pippϕ, sq ě pixpϕq
and pippϕ, sq ě 0 hold together. We characterize this set of conditions by defining four
different productivity cutoffs that describe combinations of productivity and subsidy rates
pϕ, sq for which a firm is indifferent between a given pair of production modes.
We start with the two standard cutoffs ϕ˚ and ϕx˚ that identify domestic firms and regular
4Defever and Rian˜o (2014) study the general case in which export share requirements can take an arbitrary
value.
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exporters in the Melitz (2003) model in the absence of pure exporters,
ϕ˚ “
ˆ
fd
κAc
˙ 1
σ´1
, (3)
ϕ˚x “ τ
ˆ
fx
κAf
˙ 1
σ´1
. (4)
These two cutoffs are respectively, the productivity level above which a Chinese firm would
find it profitable to produce for the domestic market alone tϕ : pidpϕ˚q “ 0u, and the
productivity level necessary for a firm to choose to become a regular exporter tϕ : pixpϕx˚q “
0u. We assume that in the absence of subsidies, exporters are more productive than domestic
firms in China, i.e. we assume that fd{fx ď Ac{pτ 1´σAf q, which implies ϕ˚ ď ϕx˚.
We define two additional cutoffs that arise in the presence of a pure exporters. Let ϕpsq
be the productivity level at which a firm would be indifferent between being a regular or a
pure exporter, i. e. ϕpsq “ tϕ : pippϕ, sq “ picpϕqu. Thus, ϕpsq is given by,
ϕpsq “
ˆ
fd
κpAc ´ τ 1´σAf rp1` sqσ ´ 1sq
˙ 1
σ´1
. (5)
Inspection of (5) reveals that ϕpsq is strictly increasing in s, with ϕp0q “ ϕ˚ and ϕpsmax1 q Ñ
8, with smax1 defined below. In order for a firm to choose to operate as a pure rather than a
regular exporter, it must be the case that the subsidy it receives is greater than the profits it
could earn in the domestic market. Thus, high productivity firms require high subsidy rates
to be swayed towards operating as pure exporters.
Similarly, let ϕpsq be the productivity level such that a firm would be indifferent between
selling only in the domestic market and operating as a pure exporter. That is, ϕpsq is defined
implicitly by ϕpsq “ tϕ : pippϕ, sq “ pidpϕqu. This condition reads:
ϕpsq “
ˆ
fx ´ fd
κpτ 1´σAf p1` sqσ ´ Acq
˙ 1
σ´1
. (6)
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Figure 2: Choice of Mode of Operation with Pure Exporters
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Under the additional assumption that fx ą fd, it follows that ϕpsq is strictly decreasing in
s whenever s ą smin, with smin defined below. Firms with productivity ϕ P pϕ˚, ϕx˚q which
would prefer to operate domestically in the absence of subsidies, find it profitable to change
their production mode if the additional revenue they receive because of the subsidy is greater
than the difference in fixed costs, fx ´ fd. Therefore, domestic firms with relatively high
productivity levels would require a lower subsidy to become pure exporters. Figure 2 plots
all the different cutoffs in tϕ, su-space.
Comparing all four cutoffs (3)-(6), it follows that pure exporters arise when s is such
that ϕpsq ď ϕpsq. The minimum subsidy necessary for firms to choose the pure exporter
operation mode, smin, is given by,
smin “
ˆ
1` Ac
τ 1´σAf
´ fd
fx
˙ 1
σ ´ 1 ą 0. (7)
Figure 2 also shows that ϕpsminq “ ϕpsminq “ ϕx˚. Therefore, when s ě smin, pure exporters
start to arise around the no-subsidy export cutoff, ϕx˚. This implies that pure exporters are
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more productive than domestic firms, but less so than regular exporters.5
As s increases, the share of active firms operating as pure exporters increases at the
expense of domestic firms and regular exporters. In fact, if s is sufficiently high, either
domestic firms or regular exporters would disappear. As noted above, let smax1 be the value
of subsidy for which ϕpsq Ñ 8, that is,
smax1 ”
ˆ
1` Ac
τ 1´σAf
˙ 1
σ ´ 1, (8)
meaning that no firm would find it profitable to operate as a regular exporter. If on the
other hand, it is the case that a very large subsidy stops firms from producing uniquely for
the domestic market, we can define smax2 as the subsidy value for which ϕpsmax2 q “ ϕ˚, i.e.
smax2 ”
ˆ
fx
fd
Ac
τ 1´σAf
˙ 1
σ ´ 1. (9)
Proposition 1 summarizes the conditions under which the three modes of production arise
in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Assume that fd{fx ď Ac{pτ 1´σAf q and fd ă fx, the three modes of pro-
duction k P
!
d, p, x
)
coexist in the presence of a positive and sufficiently large subsidy s,
such that s P
´
smin,min tsmax1 , smax2 u
¯
. Firms with productivity ϕ P
”
ϕ˚, ϕpsq
¯
only oper-
ate domestically, firms with productivity levels ϕ P
”
ϕpsq, ϕpsq
¯
choose to operate as pure
exporters, and firms with ϕ ě ϕpsq self-select into regular exporters.
5Defever and Rian˜o (2014) show that this prediction requires that the effective fixed cost of operation of
pure exporters to be higher than that of domestic firms. If the converse is true, for instance if pure exporters
also receive subsidies affecting their fixed cost (e.g. reduced land rental rates or public utilities), then firms
choosing to operate as pure exporters would be less productive than domestic firms. Empirically, Defever
and Rian˜o (2014) find that pure exporters in China are indeed more productive than domestic firms and less
productive than regular exporters. The latter prediction of the model should hold regardless of the whether
the subsidy is applied to sales or fixed costs as long as domestic firms coexist alongside pure and regular
exporters in equilibrium.
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3 General Equilibrium and Calibration
We follow Defever and Rian˜o (2014) and introduce subsidies with ESR in an otherwise
standard two-country, general equilibrium of trade with heterogenous firms as in Melitz
(2003). We assume that only one country (i.e. China) uses these subsidies.
There are two countries in the world, China (c) and the rest of the World (f), each of size
Li, i P tc, fu. Consumers in each country have CES preferences that yield demand functions
like (1), with Ai ” EiP σ´1i , where Ei denotes country i’s total expenditure and Pi is the
ideal price index in the same country. Labor is the only input of production; there is a mass
of potential entrants who draw their idiosyncratic productivity from a Pareto distribution
Gpϕq “ 1 ´ ϕ´a after paying a sunk cost fe.6 The problem for Chinese firms is identical to
the one described in Section 2, while producers in the rest of the world cannot operate as
pure exporters.
Equilibrium in the model is characterized by a vector of wages, mass of active firms and
price indices such that in both countries the labor market clears, there is free entry, and
aggregate income equals aggregate expenditure (i.e. trade is balanced). Subsidies with ESR
in China are financed via lump-sum taxes levied on households and the government’s budget
is balanced.
Both countries are assumed to be identical in terms of size and the vector of parameters
faced by firms and consumers. We calibrate the model following a similar strategy as Defever
and Rian˜o (2014). Table 1 presents the parameters used to solve the model.
The parameters pfd, fx, τ, sq are chosen to match four moments: (i) the shares (among
all active firms) of regular (ii) and pure exporters (i.e. firms exporting more than 97% of
their sales) of 26 and 9% respectively, (iii) an export/sales ratio for regular exporters of
36.1%, and a (iv) productivity premium of pure exporters vis-a`-vis domestic firms of 37.6%.
The first three moments are calculated using data from the BEEPS dataset for the year
6All fixed costs are denominated in units of labor.
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Table 1: Simulation Parameters
Parameter Description Value
Li Country i’s size, i P tc, fu 1.00
σ Elasticity of substitution 3.00
fe Entry cost 1.00
a Pareto distribution shape parameter 2.76
fd Fixed cost of operating in the domestic market 0.46
fx Fixed cost of exporting 0.71
τ Iceberg transportation cost 1.29
s 100%-ESR subsidy 0.30
2002; the total factor productivity premium is for the year 2002 and is estimated using the
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) algorithm with data for the period 2000-2006 from the annual
survey of Chinese manufacturing firms compiled by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS).
The magnitude of the calibrated transport cost and the fixed cost of exporting (relative to
the domestic fixed cost) are within the range of estimates reported in the literature. More
importantly, a 30% ad-valorem sales subsidy with a 100% ESR is required to match the share
of pure exporters operating in China in 2002. The calibrated subsidy is slightly smaller than
the 33.2% inferred in the richer model used in Defever and Rian˜o (2014), which features
multiple export share requirements, not only a 100% one as in the current exercise; total
expenditure on pure exporter subsidies accounts for 1.23% of GDP in the benchmark model.
4 Decreasing Subsidies with ESR
We use the calibrated model to infer the reduction in subsidies with ESR that is consistent
with the share of pure exporters declining from 25.7% of all exporters in 2002-2003 to 11.1%
in 2012-2013 in the BEEPS data. We then evaluate how the fall in subsidies with ESR
affected total expenditure in subsidies, exports and welfare both in China and in the rest of
the world (ROW). The results of this experiment are presented in Table 2.
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Table 2: Fall in the Share of Pure Exporters (among exporting firms) from 25.7% to 11.1%
Variable 2002 2013 % Change
100%-ESR subsidy rate 30.00% 27.53% -6.90
Subsidies/GDP, China 1.23% 0.42% -65.85
Exports/GDP, China 30.93% 29.97% -3.10
Welfare, China 1.76
Welfare, ROW -0.59
A reduction in the 100%-ESR subsidy rate from 30 to 27.53% matches the reduction in
the share of pure exporters among exporting firms in China. As shown in Figure 2, the
share of pure exporters is highly responsive to changes in the subsidy rate. Similarly, total
expenditure in export subsidies falls by a staggering 65%.
Reducing subsidies with ESR improves China’s welfare, measured as real disposable in-
come, by 1.76%. The tax burden on Chinese consumers is lessened, and they are now able
to enjoy a greater variety of goods which were previously produced in China but were only
available to foreign consumers (a ‘love-of-variety’ effect increases welfare directly). Moreover,
because of tougher domestic competition, the price index in China also falls. Welfare for
ROW falls as its imports become more expensive, experiencing a terms-of-trade loss.
5 Conclusion
The results of our exercise suggest that indeed China has gradually diminish the degree of
dualism in its trade policy regime over the last decade. Phasing out the advantages granted
to export-oriented firms has reduced the tax burden on consumers, improved terms-of-trade
and produced sizable welfare gains. However, there is still scope for further reform. Our
simple model suggests that China would stand to realize an additional 1 percent increase in
real income if it were to fully eliminate subsidies with export share requirements.
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